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BAR BRIEFS
The Bar Board is asking the Courts of the state to refuse to
recognize any attorney whose name does not appear in the published list, unless he is able to produce a license for the current
year, hence delinquents should pay up and secure a license.
LAW SCHOOL NEWS
The University of North Dakota School of Law completed its
forty-first school year on June 11, 1940. Sixteen graduating
students were awarded their law degrees. They were as follows:
Edwin M. Barbie of Bismarck, Mary Lou DeMoully of Flasher, Earl C. Erickson of Garrison, Larry R. Forest of Brinsmade,
Alice T. Fox of Grand Forks, Lyle E. Huseby of Grand Forks,
James Edward Leo of Grand Forks, Jim V. Miller of Minot, Harry
0. Mowery of Napoleon, Dale M. Nordquist of Underwood, Donald
E. Roney of Oakes, Alex W. Skoropat of Wilton, Francis C.
Swanke of Kulm, William W. Swinland of Lakota, Roland B. Weiss
of Sheldon and Leo A. Wikenheiser of Strasburg.
Like former graduates, the present graduates realize that
practice is not the only field in which they may make use of their
knowledge and skill. The records show that out of the 663 law
graduates, some obtained positions as adjusters with insurance
companies; others secured work with the state or federal government for which their legal training qualified them; some became
teachers; few of them became law editors; and several entered business. However, a majority of them entered upon the practice of
law. The members of the Class of 1940 will likewise prove worthy
of their training by adapting themselves to changing conditions.
If a member of the North Dakota Bar or any of the alumni in
North Dakota or elsewhere are considering adding men toi their
firm or know of any opening, they can do a good turn to themselves and our new graduates by letting the School of Law know
of these opportunities.
FRAZIER - LEMKE ACT
Farmer mortgagor, unable to effect composition with creditors, applied to be adjudged a bankrupt under 49 Stat. 242, subsection s, (1935); Chandler Act of 1935; 11 U.S.C.A. 203, subsection s; and be allowed to retain possession of his farm for three
years. The District Court refused application on grounds that
debtor would be unable to rehabiliatate himself within three years
and lacked requisite "good faith" as required by subsection i. On
appeal to United States Supreme Court, Held, if debtor has compiled with statutory proceedings, the district court must suspend
for three years all proceedings to seize his property. Only test is
that debtor must pay a reasonable rental semi-annually. The
"good faith" of subsection i. refers to secret advantages to favored creditors or other improper or fraudulent conduct and does
not refer to probability to financially rehabilitate himself. John
Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Bartels 60 S. Ct. 21, 81
L.Ed. 154, 307 U.S. 617; (1939).
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Congress passed the original Frazier-Lemke act in response
to the demands of farmers that their indebtedness be decreased
to correspond to the decreased value of their farm lands. The Act
of 1933 was declared unconstitutional in Louisville, on grounds
that secured creditors property rights were not protected and
were taken without just compensation. Joint Stock Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555, 55 S. Ct. 854, 79 L. Ed. 1593; (1935).
The Act of 1935 was framed to meet the court's objections
and was held valid in Wright v. Vinton Branch 300 U.S. 400, 57
S.CT. 55; (1937).
Under the new Act the district court allowed relief only if
the debtor could show reasonable probability of repaying existing
indebtedness at the end of the three year moratorium. Relief
was refused on grounds that section 75 i required "good faith"
which courts interpreted as showing debtor could pay off indebtedness and was not using Act as a subterfuge to temporarily
evade payment. In re Eastman, 29 F., Supp. 954 (1939); In re
Van Vliet, 28 F. Supp. 594 (1939); In re Putman 27 F. Supp. 813
1939. Last December in the Bartel case the United States
Supreme Court held "good faith" meant lack of secret agreements with creditors, that farmer need not show ability to repay
within three years, and that the only test was the paying of a
reasonable rental.
In one of the two district court cases up to this time the
debtor had neither probability of rehabiliating himself nor of
paying a reasonable rental. Yet the court held that proceedings
should be allowed under subsections, that a reasonable rental be
fixed, and that debtor be allowed to remain in possession. In re
Byrenius, 30 F. Supp. 241, (1939). In the other district court
case it was held that the mere fact that value of the real estate
is less than the security does not warrant stopping proceedings
under subsection s. In re Lysinger et al, 31 F. Supp. 431; (1940).
However, if the test in the Bartel case of paying a reasonable rental is applied, it seems likely that the district court will
order sale of the property when the rental cannot be paid. Paradise Land & Livestock Co. v. Federal Land Bank, 108 F. (2d) 832,
(1939). Three Circuit Court cases have been decided since the
principal case. In the first case an abbreviated decision without
facts reversed lower court dismissal of farmers petition on the
ground that the lower court labored under misapprehension
prevalent at the time of the decision, but which was corrected by
the Bartel Case. McCook v. Federal Land Bank of Columbia 108
F. (2d) 185, (1939).
In another case the Circuit Court merely repeated parts of
the Bartel decision and held that debtor with small probability of
financial rehabilitating himself could proceed under subsection s.
Union Oil Co. of California v. American Bitumuls Co. 109 F.
(2d) 140, (1940).
An appraisal of the land and a reasonable rental had been
fixed under the terms of subsection s, but the district court upon
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creditors petition dismissed the proceedings on the ground that
there was no probability of rehabilitation, even though the debtor
had offered to pay in cash the rent as determined. The Circuit
Court stressed the necessity of safeguarding rights of creditors
as well as of debtors, but reversed lower court and ordered
further proceedings. However, the court stated that after administration had started, it was up to the district court to determine how long debtor should be allowed to retain possession.
Paradise Land & Livestock Co. v. Federal Bank 108 F. (2d) 832
(1939).
JIM MILLER,
Law Student.
JUSTICE PIERCE BUTLER
Recently in Kansas City, memorial services were held for the
late Justice Pierce Butler of the United States Supreme Court by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Chief Justice Kimbrough Stone, of the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals, made the principal address.
It follows:
Were this an occasion when those things which are essentially personal should be said, I would try to voice something of
my estimate of this man for whom I held a genuine affection and
whom it was my precious privilege to have had as a friend. However, I may say that as I deeply valued that friendship during his
life, so shall the memory of that association be to me a benediction always. What I wish now is to try, from the more impersonal position of an American judge and citizen, to point out one
meaning of his loss as a justice of our supreme tribunal.
The death of Justice Butler would have been a pronounced
loss to the Nation at any time. It would have signified always
the passing of a great man from important public service. But
such loss is far accentuated by his passing when he did; and,
therefore, his high worth is brought out in clearer outline. This
arises from the situation in the Court at that time and his relation thereto.
The situation has to do with the attitudes of the members of
the Court toward decisions involving social or economic matters
coming before it. For convenience in stating these attitudes, I
employ the indefinite and changeful terms of "conservative" and
"liberal."
A few years after Justice Butler became a member of the
Court, it came about that there were, as to decisions on social and
economic matters, four members who' might be regarded as conservative; two who were liberal; and three who were not definitely either. The result was, generally speaking, that such decisions of the Court were conservative, as that term is now understood. Shift in personnel exactly reversed that situation before
Justice Butler died. There were then two conservatives, four
liberals, and the same three intermediates.

